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Recent Work  
First-person thought (pre-proof version) 
Daniel Morgan and Léa Salje 
1. Introduction 
Subjects have various ways of thinking about themselves. Here are three examples: a subject can 
think of herself under an appropriate description (the hiker), demonstratively (that person), or by 
mentally mouthing her name (NN). Whenever a subject thinks of herself in one of these ways, 
there is a further question whether she also realises that it is she herself she is thereby thinking of. 
By contrast, there is another way of thinking of oneself deserving of a place on this list that 
seemingly differs in this respect – the way of thinking of oneself first-personally, or de se (we’ll use 
these terms interchangeably). As a heuristic, we might say that this is the kind of thought about 
herself that a thinker would naturally express using a first-person pronoun in language (“I am F”, 
or “The F is me”).  
It’s easy to feel that de se thought doesn’t just deserve a place on our list; it deserves a top spot. 
After all, even if a subject can think of herself in the three initial ways mentioned above, surely her 
first-personal way of thinking of herself looms much larger in her mental life than the others, both 
with respect to how often she thinks of herself in that way and how important the capacity to do 
so is to her normal functioning. Historically, first-person thought has attracted a great deal of 
philosophical attention. As Peacocke writes, ‘[a]rticulating the phenomena distinctive of the first-
person has drawn forth some of the most striking contributions from the greatest philosophers 
…’ (2008: 77). The aim of this article is to frame some of the more recent movements and insights 
in the area from the last decade or so.  
First, what is de se thought? We’ve offered as a heuristic a relation to a bit of language: the first-
person pronoun. But you might wonder whether this is really its most explanatorily important 
property. One might think that a deeper characterisation will be available in terms of something 
more intrinsic – e.g. the story about how de se thoughts achieve their reference. Such a 
characterisation would inevitably import controversy. The most popular contemporary view is that 
de se thoughts are governed by a rule that they refer to whoever is thinking them.1 However, not 
everyone agrees. Some are tempted to deny that de se thought is referential at all.2 Some think that 
 
1 See Campbell (2012), Peacocke (2014), O’ Brien (2007). 
2 See Doyle (2018) 
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different instances of de se thought might be associated with different referential stories.3 Finally, 
some think that de se thoughts might have similar referential stories to perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts.4 But all these people can agree that there is some distinctive kind of thought associated 
with the first-person pronoun. Since we want to use the term de se in such a way as to make it as 
uncontentious as possible, nothing we say will depend on anything beyond the linguistic 
characterisation (unless otherwise mentioned).   
The domain of first-person thought is not characterised by a central organising question. Instead, 
it makes up a somewhat disorderly collection of questions – sometimes interconnected, sometimes 
not – about the cognitive, metaphysical, and normative significance of first-person thought, as well 
as questions about how best to model it, and how to reconcile our philosophical theories in this 
area with findings from the cognitive sciences. Just a few topics that we might have, but have not, 
discussed in this article include: the continued development of arguments in the metaphysics of 
personal identity that draw on premises involving claims about de se thought5; a mini-resurgence 
of interest in the Cogito, and related epistemic issues6; an increased interest in the ‘sense of 
mineness’ (and relatedly, in the role that some argue de se thought plays in a full account of 
conscious experience)7; the relation of sophisticated forms of de se thought to more primitive, 
including non-conceptual precursors8; how much the de se has in common with the de nunc9; and 
even the possibility of leveraging de se phenomena in support of absolute idealism.10  
Instead we have chosen two areas to discuss in detail: scepticism about the distinctive 
philosophical importance of de se thought (§2), and immunity to error through misidentification 
(IEM) as it shows up in de se thought (§3). The reason for this selection is that these strike us as 
two of the most active areas involving the de se: in both cases, there has been notable movement 
in the state of the debate in the last ten years, partly as a result of contributions from different 
authors rebounding off each other in a sustained way.  
 
2. Scepticism about the importance of the de se 
 
3 See Longuenesse (2017) and Johnston (2010) 
4 See Morgan (2015) and Setiya (2015). 
5 See Hamilton (2013), Peacocke (2014), Madden (2011, 2013) 
6 See Peacocke (2012), Campbell (2012), and O’Brien (2015) 
7 See Guillot and García-Carpintero (forthcoming) 
8 See Musholt (2015), Bermùdez (2016) and Peacocke (2014) 
9 See Morgan (2019a) 
10 See Rödl (2018)   
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One apparently pressing philosophical task concerning the de se is to get a clear picture of the 
distinctive features it has that are relevant to various aspects of mind – e.g. intentional action, 
emotion, perception, reasoning, understanding. The liveliest, most joined up, recent debate has 
focused on intentional action, so we’ll focus on that, while leaving open the extent to which the 
dialectic around action might mirror other areas. The discussion here is very example-driven, and 
the diet of examples has been around since the 70s. What is newer in the last ten years is an 
acknowledgement that it’s not clear what those familiar examples establish.11 This is stimulated by 
a resourcefully defended minority position according to which they do not establish anything of 
interest about the de se.12 We’ll call this position de se scepticism, and opponents of the position de se 
fans. Relatively few have found de se scepticism wholly convincing, but the versions of de se fandom 
that have emerged in response to it are instructively different.  
Here is one of the influential cases: Perry is following a trail of sugar along a supermarket floor, 
looking for the messy shopper who is creating the trail. At some point, Perry realizes ‘I am the 
messy shopper’. Having realized this, Perry stops following the trail and sorts out his own trolley 
(Perry 1979: 3). 
De se sceptics have acknowledged that cases like this one show that going from thinking of oneself 
in a non-de se way to a de se way can make a difference to how one acts (as Perry noted). But they 
point out that that just seems to a special case of the more general point that how one acts depends 
not just on what things one is thinking about, but how one is thinking about them. We can create 
the same kind of effect using a non-de se example in which an agent moves from using one proper 
name to another co-referential one. E.g. Lois hails a man she had previously ignored because she 
comes to realize that the man, whom she had already recognized as Clark Kent, is Superman, the 
very person she’d been wanting to talk to. In slogan form: de se cases are just opacity cases.  
On these grounds, Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015) both argue that in order for 
there to be a distinctive connection between the de se and action, the de se would have to be involved 
in every explanation of action, thus raising the bar on what the fan of the de se seems to need to 
show. They then note that simply inspecting a few cases, such as Perry’s case, provides no support 
for that universal generalization. Constructively, they offer a recipe for generating examples of 
 
11 See for example Prosser (2015: 211), Ninan (2016:86) and Torre (2018:172). 
12 See Cappelen and Dever (2013), and Magidor (2015). Other defenders of views in the same broad area – in that 
they also think exaggerated claims have been made about the de se – include Devitt (2013), Millikan (1990), Spencer 




action in whose explanation no de se attitude figures. The key ingredient is that that the agent lacks 
any self-directed attitude at all – so the question of whether that attitude must be de se does not 
arise.  The agent forms an intention that a certain state of affairs obtain – e.g. that a certain door 
is closed, that a charity is donated to – and that triggers their action. Granted, to bring such a result 
about, the agent will have to do something else – e.g. move their body in a certain way. But, the 
suggestion is, this need not involve the formation of a self-referential attitude (e.g. a de se intention 
the agent would express with ‘I walk over to the door and turn my hand’). The agent may simply 
be wired up so that when they form intentions whose contents are ‘actionable’ states of affair, their 
subpersonal systems cause their bodies to move in such a way as to cause those states of affairs to 
obtain. It’s uncontroversial that there comes a point at which the selection of means to our ultimate 
ends does not involve having a further thought (e.g. moving my arm might involve a shift in my 
shoulder blade, even if I do not have a further thought about my shoulder blade). There is, the 
proposal is, no guarantee that the self will always be in view by the time this point is reached.  
This ‘action without self-reference’ idea could be given in different strengths. It could be outlining 
an in-principle, metaphysical possibility for agency. Or it could be outlining a possibility that 
human agents instantiate as they go about their business. Cappelen and Dever (2013: 40) are 
explicit that they need only claim the in-principle possibility. Their idea is that a need for the de se 
that is local to human agents would be of little interest, and could not in any case be discovered 
without detailed scientific investigation, of a sort fans of the de se have never rested their claims 
on. So considering whether an agent that was also a God could act without the de se, for example, 
would be dialectically legitimate. Most fans of the de se are, on the face of it, not restricting their 
claims to any particular category of agents (e.g. human agents, embodied agents, agents who are 
not Gods). A notable exception here is García-Carpintero (2017) who argues that the need for the 
de se is a deep contingent fact about human agency, and not less interesting for that. Prosser (2015) 
explores some of the conceptual issues around Godly activity and the de se.  
A second choice-point for de se fans is whether they want to claim that all action-explanations 
involve the de se (and therefore that there must be something wrong with the ‘action without self-
reference’ proposal). Many clearly do.13 Gjelsvik appeals to an Anscombian view on which doing 
something intentionally involves having practical knowledge of I am doing it. Babb appeals to a 
Castañeda inspired view on which intentional action always involves intention and intentions are, 
as such, de se (the intention that the door be closed is really an intention that I bring it about that the door 
is closed). The involvement of the de se in every case of action falls rather directly out of either of 
 
13 See, e.g., Babb (2016), Bermúdez (2017), Gjelsvik (2017), Morgan (2019b). 
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these theories. On either view, it looks as though an account of the relationship between action 
and the de se is supported – indirectly – by the full range of evidential considerations that the overall 
theory of action (and, in Babb’s case, theory of intention) is supported by. In that case, it’s hardly 
surprising that simply inspecting a few de se cases and seeing what our intuitions about them are, 
is not enough to show what the relationship is. 
Other fans of the de se have seemed not to commit to the maximally strong claim that all action-
explanations involve the de se. But, as noted, the only alternative de se sceptics tend to consider – 
the claim that some action-explanations involve the de se – seems too weak to be interesting. So 
what other kind of claim might such a fan of the de se appeal to? A candidate is: ‘Some action-
explanations involve the de se in a way that otherwise attractive theory T cannot deal with’. Here 
the role of the de se is not just as a phenomenon with special features, but as a special problem or 
challenge – in this case, for theory T.14 Lewis conceived of de se cases in this way, seeing them as 
producing a problem for the possible worlds theory of propositional attitudes he thought 
otherwise attractive. So did Perry, with respect to any theory that endorses what he calls ‘the 
doctrine of propositions’ (1979). In the last decade, de se sceptics have put a great deal of pressure 
on whether the ‘otherwise attractive’ condition is ever really met. Perhaps theories that can’t deal 
with de se cases equally can’t deal with non-de se cases, in which case the de se doesn’t raise a special 
problem after all. One reason this issue matters is that what form a more adequate framework will 
take is plausibly sensitive to the range of cases that were making difficulty for the previous 
framework. Moving to a framework like Lewis’s centered-worlds theory, whose chief innovation 
is that it has a special bit of machinery to deal with de se cases, looks like a bad bet, if the problem 
provoking the move isn’t in fact special to the de se.15  
This has led in turn to greater precision from those who think de se cases are a distinctive problem 
about how the distinctive problem is supposed to arise. For example, Ninan (2016) (who presents 
his position as a rational reconstruction of ideas that were already present in Perry and Lewis) 
argues roughly as follows. Consider a case where one agent believes ‘I am being chased by a bear’ 
and another believes, of her, ‘You am being chased by a bear’.  It looks as though this is a case in 
which the two agents should count as having different beliefs, since their expected actions are 
 
14 Magidor (2016: 249) makes this helpful distinction between treating the de se as having special features vs. posing a 
special problem.  
15 See Magidor (2016) for argument that Lewis is wrong to think that, with generous enough appeal to descriptivism, 
the possible worlds framework that can’t deal with the de se can deal with all non de se cases of opacity. Cappelen and 
Dever (2013) explore a different complaint against Lewis’s centred-worlds theory: that the special bit of machinery it 
involves – the notion of self-ascription – is unexplanatory of de se ness. For more on the centered-possible worlds 
framework, see many of the essays in García-Carpintero and Torre (eds.) (2016).  
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different (even if they both desire the same thing, e.g. that nobody be eaten). However, it also looks 
as though they are in complete agreement on how things are. This puts pressure on any theory on 
which there is a single notion of content that plays a role in capturing what it is for two subjects 
to agree, and that is also fine-grained enough to individuate mental states. The second, equally 
essential, part of the argument is the claim that it isn’t possible to come up with non-de se cases that 
show the same thing. Ninan’s idea here is that if two subjects count as agreeing in virtue of both 
believing, of Superman, that he has a certain property then they’ll express their belief with the 
same sentence (it won’t be that one thinks ‘Superman is being chased by a bear’ and the other 
thinks ‘Clark is being chased by a bear’). But in this case, Ninan thinks, there is no particular 
obstacle to saying the two subjects have the same belief, since we don’t in fact expect very different 
actions arising from the belief each has. This argument, if sound, would seem to be a vindication 
of the claim that the de se plays a distinctive role in relation to action.16 But notice that there’s no 
incompatibility between the soundness of the argument and the in-principle possibility, or even 
everyday occurrence, of action without self-reference. At least some de se fans may thus be tempted 
to regard the claim that all action-explanations involve the de se as a red herring.  
Most of the action discussed in this literature has been of a fairly unsophisticated humdrum sort 
– spilling sugar, hailing people, avoiding bears etc. Several recent contributions move towards 
normatively richer territory. Setiya (2015) discusses what he takes to be a widely accepted view that 
we have a distinctive kind of reason to favour ourselves, conceived de se. He argues that we in fact 
do not and that our tendency to favour ourselves is the primordial case of love at first sight. Paul 
(2017a, 2017b) argues that there is a notion of empathy that is both essentially de se, and crucial to 
explaining our moral assessment and decision-making – being able to imaginatively project oneself 
into the first-person perspective of another.17 She also argues for a notion of self-understanding that 
is essentially de se. Titelbaum (2017) argues that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning 
processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others. 
O’Brien (2011) argues that de se thought – or more specifically, the subjective perspective it entails 
– is one of the preconditions for the various shades of self-conscious emotion, e.g. shame, guilt, 
 
16 The argument involves an ‘I’-‘you’ case. Leaving aside the question of whether such cases pose a special problem 
for otherwise well-motivated theories, there has been a recent mini-explosion of interest, especially from those 
working in the neo-Fregean tradition, of how to think about the de te, either in its own right or in its relationship with 
the de se. Longworth (2014) argues that some de te thoughts are de se thoughts. Salje (2017) argues that there is an 
irreducible mode of presentation associated with you. Peacocke (2014b) and Martin (2014) debate the right way to 
think about interpersonal self-consciousness, in which one is aware of oneself as figuring as an object in someone 
else’s consciousness, and the connection to the de te. For more on the relationship between the de se and de te, see many 
of the essays in the Philosophical Explorations (2014) special issue on ‘you’-thought.  
17 Cappelen and Dever (2017) reply to Paul by denying that the notion of empathy that matters in moral psychology 
involves the de se.  
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pride. From the point of view of evaluating de se skepticism, the range of points at which the de se 
might appear important makes the sceptical position more challenging to defend. Anyone who 
accepts the various features has an explanatory task of explaining why they are all aspects of a 
single kind of thought.18 
3. Immunity to error through misidentification 
A second live sub-area in de se thought involves a pair of epistemic properties – error through 
misidentification (EM) and immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) – as they show up in de se 
thoughts. Take a thought of the form Fa. Here are two ways it is potentially vulnerable to error: 
the thinker might be right that something is F but be wrong in identifying that thing as a; or she 
might be right that a is something, but wrong about whether it is F. Roughly, IEM is immunity 
against the first kind of mistake. Most people think that a privileged class of de se thoughts is IEM. 
(If I judge in the normal way that I feel nervous, then it’s hard to see how I could be wrong about 
who feels nervous.) Most people also deny that de se thoughts are the only ones associated with this 
property – it’s normally also taken to be a property of (some) demonstrative, other indexical, and 
mathematical thoughts, and thoughts involving descriptive names.19 As a matter of fact, however, 
most work on IEM has been work on IEM as it applies to de se thought. This means that debates 
about IEM are intermingled with the de se in a way that has substantially affected the moves and 
positions that have emerged. (As we will see in a moment, an especially pronounced version of 
this preferential treatment can be seen in recent views of IEM that explicitly draw on metasemantic 
features of the de se.) Moreover, some theorists have looked to IEM as a precisely definable notion 
that might help more render more tractable questions concerning the de se that seem to be of 
maximal philosophical interest but whose existing formulations make hard to adjudicate.20   
IEM is not a new concept. Its potted history normally begins with Wittgenstein’s brief remarks in 
The Blue Book (1958), through Shoemaker’s elaboration of the phenomenon and coining of the 
phrase (1968), to Evans’s (1982) influential account that (among other things) made it standard to 
relativise IEM to the grounds on which a thought is formed. The debate since then has been 
characterised by a spirited, if sometimes less than fully coordinated, search for the correct 
formulation, explanation, and account of the significance of IEM. This more recent literature can 
sometimes be difficult to piece together, partly because different views of IEM are often developed 
 
18 For attempts to derive various de se phenomena from the reference rule he takes to govern de se thought, see Peacocke 
(2012).  
19 See also Smith (2018) for a discussion about whether it also applies to plural first-person reference (we-thought).  
20 See, e.g. Morgan (2018a) 
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in the context of pursuing different broader projects. However, the last decade or so in this debate 
has seen a new and interesting division in party-lines, which we will focus on here.  
The first camp emerging from the split is the identification-freedom approach, characterised by the 
claim that the presence of IEM is always explained by the absence of an identificatory-component 
in the thought’s grounds. If the thought I am F isn’t reached by putting together a distinct thought 
of the form b is F with an identity of the form b=I, then it looks as though there is no point at 
which an error of misidentification could get introduced. After all, a misidentification is just an 
identification that has gone wrong, and grounds of this sort do not involve an identification. On 
the identification-freedom approach, then, a de se thought is IEM when, and because, it is formed in a 
way that involves directly apprehending oneself in an exclusively de se way. A merit of this approach 
to IEM is that it ‘liberates us from any need for metaphysical or metasemantic extravagance in 
trying to account for the phenomenon.’ (Wright, 2012: 255) 
There are a number of internal disagreements among contemporary identity-freedom theorists.21 
One is how to understand the idea of grounds. Nearly no-one thinks that the possibility of EM 
requires the performance of a conscious inference (b is F, I = b, so I am F). But there are still 
varyingly demanding ways of understanding what is needed. Does the identity component need to 
be part of a rational reconstruction of the subject’s reasoning? Would it suffice for it to be part of 
a thinker’s presuppositional background to which she has default entitlement, if not ready access? 
Or does it need to be accessible to the subject, at least in principle? Different identity-freedom 
theorists answer these questions differently, resulting in formulations of IEM-properties of 
different strengths that sort cases differently.22 
The most urgent current issue for the identity-freedom camp, however, is an external challenge 
descending from Pryor’s influential 1999 distinction between two kinds of error (and immunity) 
through misidentification.23 The first, de re misidentification, fits neatly with the identity-freedom 
approach: where there is de re misidentification, the belief’s grounds involve a false identity-belief. 
 
21 One prominent continuing issue is whether to admit different grades of IEM, such as absolute/logical/de jure/de 
facto, or to only treat one of these as genuine IEM (see, e.g., Coliva (2012, 2017), Recanati (2012), Prosser (2012), 
García-Carpentiro (2013, 2015), McGlynn (2016).) Another is how to treat the presence of indubitably known 
identities (See, e.g., Smith (2006) and Coliva (2017). 
22 Sometimes this issue is posed in terms of justificational architecture, doxastic or epistemic structure, formative structure, or 
explanatory/causal basis, or discussed in the context of a distinction between liberal and conservative views of epistemic 
justification; for more discussion see Coliva (2006, 2012), Wright (2012), McGlynn (2016, ms), Morgan (2018), and 
García-Carpintero (2013, 2018). 
23 Pryor 1999; several recent writers have attempted to improve on Pryor’s original formulation (e.g. Hu (2017), Merlo 
(2017), Morgan (2018), Recanati (2012), McGlynn 2016, ms) 
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The second is the notion of wh-misidentification, and is still usually introduced with Pryor’s original 
example:  
I smell a skunky odor, and see several animals rummaging around in my garden. (…) 
Approaching closer and sniffing I form the belief, of the smallest of animals, that it is a 
skunk in my garden. This belief is mistaken. There are several skunks in my garden, but 
none of them is the small animal I see. (1999: 281).  
My grounds for the belief That is a skunk seems not to rest on a false identity of the form a=b. 
Instead, I have grounds for an existentially general belief about a property-instantiation (Something 
hereabouts is a skunk, based on smell), but I have picked out the wrong witness to that existential. It 
is still appropriate to say that my thought is mistaken through a misidentification. But it is a 
‘misidentification’ in the sense of being a faulty ‘singling out’ of the right witness, rather than a 
faulty identity of the form a=b.  Such cases appear to show that the fact a thought includes nothing 
of the form a=b in its grounds is compatible with its not being IEM. That puts pressure on the 
claim that a thought’s including nothing of the form a=b in its grounds is ever enough to explain 
its being IEM, even in case of thoughts that have both properties. 24  
Coliva kicked off a lively response to this challenge in her (2006), by arguing that all seeming cases 
of wh-EM can be reduced to de re-EM. Her strategy is to show that even in these cases, the grounds 
for the subject’s thought still involve a (mis)identity. It’s just that one side of the identity will 
feature a non-de re – but still singular – concept. For example, she offers the following 
reconstruction of the false identity involved in the skunk example: 
‘This animal (I can now see) = the animal (in my garden) which is actually responsible for this odor I can 
smell’. (2006: 412)  
Objectors have variously responded that this strategy illegitimately makes use of a uniqueness 
assumption (who says there was only one thing I was smelling in the original case?), relies on 
idiosyncrasies of the showcase example, or that the descriptive singular concepts invoked by this 
strategy will always be too trivial to provide genuinely informative identity-beliefs.25  
The second emerging camp from the recent split in these debates is arguably better suited to 
accommodating wh-EM. Call it the metasemantic approach (and recall that this is the kind of 
‘metasemantic extravagance’ Wright hoped the identification-freedom approach might help us 
 
24 See, e.g., Guillot (2014) and García-Carpintero (2013, 2018) for this objection to the identification-freedom view. 
25 For objectors to Coliva’s strategy, see Wright (2012), McGlynn (2016, ms), Garcia-Carpintero (2018) and Palmira 
(2019); Recanati (2012) and Prosser (2012) both endorse versions of Coliva’s strategy. 
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avoid). The metasemantic approach is newer and more heterogenous than the identification-
freedom approach, but can be grouped by a unifying ambition to provide an explanation of the 
IEM of de se thoughts that springs from an account of how the reference of de se thoughts is fixed, 
rather than just from the grounds of particular de se thoughts. As Peacocke writes: 
Whenever there are phenomena distinctive of a given concept, a good theory of that 
concept should explain those phenomena. This general point applies when the phenomena 
are those of immunity to error through misidentification, and the concept is the first 
person concept I. (2012: 144)  
Different contributors to this approach follow this injunction in different ways depending on their 
preferred metasemantic account of the de se – the view that introspective impressions play a role 
in fixing the reference of de se thoughts (Palmira (ms), García-Carpintero (2018)) or where those 
thoughts are otherwise fixed in the manner of perceptual demonstratives (Morgan 2015), will 
explain cases of de se IEM differently from a view on which it is a version the token-reflexive 
reference rule that does the explanatory work (Peacocke 2012, 2014; Hu 2017)26. It is not possible 
to survey all the options here. We will instead present one prominent version of the approach 
from Recanati (2007, 2009, 2012).  
Recanati posits a category he calls implicit de se thoughts, whose distinguishing feature is that 
although they systematically concern the thought’s thinker, that thinker is not represented in the 
thought’s content. The thought’s content is thetic (or gappy), and has a truth-value only when 
evaluated relative to a particular subject.27 When these thoughts are based directly on experience, 
the subject is delivered by the mode of the experience (approximately, the type of experiential state) 
– not because the mode fills in a representation of the subject, but because it constrains who the 
subject must be. When I have the thought I would express as “My arms are outstretched” on the 
basis of proprioception, the content of my thought is something like the open sentence ‘___ arms 
are outstretched’. The proprioceptive mode on which it is based, however, delivers me as its relevant 
circumstance of evaluation, because proprioception can only ever deliver information about 
oneself. Now, according to Recanati such implicit thoughts based directly on experience will 
always be IEM. Why? Because given that I am not represented at all in either the content of the 
thought or experience on which it is based, the basic conditions for any error of misidentification 
(in either sense) are not met.28  
 
26 See also Prosser (2012). 
27 This is the treatment Lewis gives of all de se attitudes. 
28 Cf. accounts of IEM by Ismael (2012) and Guillot (2013). Recanati also thinks that there is a second layer of de se 
thoughts with IEM – explicit de se thoughts – that do explicitly represent the thought’s subject. These de se thoughts are 
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Since nothing in this style of account depends on specific claims about the thought’s grounds, it 
isn’t per se committed to the claim that IEM is always explained by the absence of an identity-
component in those grounds. As a result, metasemantic approaches seem better positioned to 
accommodate the notion of wh-IEM. This advantage is unlikely to impress opponents following 
Coliva, who anyway think that the idea of an independent notion of wh-IEM is spurious.29 Other 
objections that have been raised against versions of the metasemantic approach include the 
comparative complexity of the account, the worry that explanations at this level cannot account 
for the basis-relativity or non-universality of de se IEM, the fact that the appeal of any one of these 
accounts of IEM is hostage to the appeal of a specific metasemantic view of the de se, and 
suspicions about the scope on this approach for a unifying account of IEM beyond the case of the 
de se.30  
The two approaches to de se IEM explanation described in this section are pitched at a high level 
of abstraction. There has also been plenty of ground-level work in the last ten years about the 
extension of de se IEM. It is striking that these first-order debates are similarly characterised by a 
lack of agreement: most (but not all) consider the IEM of introspective de se judgments to be non-
negotiable, but other candidates – including bodily awareness, agentive, and memory de se 
judgments – remain controversial.31  
Indeed, the absence of fixed points in the debate about de se IEM might raise alarm bells for some.32 
There is disagreement in this literature on, in summary, all of the following: what the extension of 
de se IEM is; what the best explanation of it is; whether it subdivides into importantly different 
sub-categories (and, if so, which these are); what significance it has for an understanding of de se 
thought; and whether the phenomenon of IEM has similar interest in non-de se cases as in de se 
cases. What’s more, the discussion has been intricate and long-running enough that an author of 
a paper might easily, and quite reasonably, concentrate on a highly localised aspect of one of these 
 
reached by a non-inferential process called ‘reflection’ from implicit de se thoughts – since no inference is involved, 
there is no new opportunity for a misidentification to be introduced. This addition to the account is not important for 
our purposes. 
29 See also Smith (2006) for another argument against wh-IEM, and McGlynn (ms) for a response; see also Salje (2016) 
for an objection to a closely related formulation of IEM.  
30See, e.g. Wright (2012), Morgan (2012), Coliva (2017) and Hu (2017). See also Campbell (2012) for an argument that 
de se thought is unique in resisting a metasemantic explanation of IEM.  
31 For some recent discussions of the IEM of introspective judgments see García-Carpintero (2018), Hu (2017), 
Parrott (2017); of bodily awareness judgments De Vignemont (2011, 2012), Schwenkler (2013a), Morgan (2018), Salje 
(2017), Lane and Liang (2011), Gallagher (2012), Kang (2016); of action judgments O’Brien (2007, 2012), Romdenh-
Romluc (2013), Lane and Liang (2011); and of memory judgments Fernandez (2014), Bermudez (2012, 2013), 
Hamilton (2009).   
32 E.g. Schwenkler (2013b) and Howell (2007). A more extreme reaction to the state of this literature is to deny the 
existence of IEM altogether (e.g. Cappelen and Dever 2013). 
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questions, without engaging with the overall question of why their doing so matters. This would 
be unproblematic in the context of a shared, unvoiced understanding of what is up for grabs in 
the debate. But it isn’t obvious that such an understanding exists. What does this mean for the 
future of these debates? As with post-Gettier attempts to rehabilitate the JTB account of 
knowledge, which eventually resulted in wholesale changes of approach to the relevant 
subdiscipline, there is the possibility that at a certain point de se theorists will just start playing a 
different game. Perhaps the concept of IEM is a tool that initially appeared helpful in 
understanding the de se, but turned out not to be. This would, of course, be compatible with 
thinking that many of the ostensibly IEM-focused papers contain important insights – for 
example, about the nature of various bodily illusions, or the notion of thought-authorship – that 
are achieved, as it were, on the way to a claim about IEM. An opposing view would be that it is 
simply a datum that certain de se judgments are IEM – however unclear it is exactly which these 
are, or how best to define the phenomenon in general terms – and eschewing the topic would just 
involve ignoring a question because it has proven hard to answer.  
4. Conclusion 
None of the debates about the de se – about its significance, distinctive features, or even existence 
– show any sign of letting up. As a topic with a long history, the continuing vigour of these 
discussions are testament to the tenacity and depth of the philosophical puzzles that give rise to 
them. While there is a widely shared instinct that there is something special about the de se that is 
illustrated by de se cases, it has proven surprisingly difficult to distil that significance into a single, 
simple point. And while there is a persistent sense that de se IEM tracks something of real 
importance, decades of sustained effort haven’t yet given us a clear shared idea of what that is. 
What is clear, however, is that there is a rich seam of philosophical material in this area that ramifies 
across mind, language, morality, theory of action, metaphysics of the self – indeed arguably across 
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Bermúdez, José Luis (2017) ‘Yes, indexicals really are essential’ Analysis 77 (4): 690-694  
Bermudez, J.L. 2017. Understanding ‘‘I’’: Language and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boer, S., and Lycan, W.G. (1980), ‘Who me?’, Philosophical Review 89: 130–157. 
Cappelen, H. and J. Dever. 2013. The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance 
of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2017) Empathy and transformative experience without the 
first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul), Inquiry, 60:3, 315-336 
Campbell, John (2012a). ‘Lichtenberg and the Cogito’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 112, 
pp. 361-378. 
Campbell, John (2012b), ‘On the thesis that ‘I’ is not a referring term’, in Simon Prosser & Francois 
Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
Chen, Cheryl (2011), ‘Bodily awareness and immunity to error through misidentification’, European 
Journal of Philosophy, 19:1 
Coliva, Annalisa (2006), ‘Error through misidentification: some varieties’, Journal of Philosophy, 103:8 
Coliva, Annalisa (2017), ‘Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee’, Inquiry, 60:3 
De Vignemont, Frédérique (2011), ‘A self for the body’, Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247. 
 14 
De Vignemont, Frédérique (2012), ‘Bodily Immunity to Error’, in Simon Prosser & Francois 
Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
Devitt, M. (2013), ‘The myth of the problematic de se’, forthcoming in Alessandro Capone and 
Neil Feit (eds.), Attitudes De se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics, CSLI. 
James Doyle. No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism. Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 2018 
 
Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, McDowell, J. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Fernández, Jordi (2014), ‘Memory and immunity to error through misidentification’, Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology, 5:3 
García-Carpintero, M and Torre, S (eds.) (2016), De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford 
University Press. 
Gallagher, Shaun (2012), ‘First-person perspective and immunity to error through 
misidentification’, in Consciousness and Subjectivity, Miguens and Preyer (eds.), Ontos Verlag. 
García-Carpintero, Manuel (2013), ‘The self file and immunity to error through misidentification’, 
in Disputatio 5 (36):191-206. 
García-Carpintero, Manuel (2018), ‘De se thoughts and immunity to error through 
misidentification’, Synthese, 195:8 
Guillot, Marie (2013), ‘The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se 
thoughts’, Synthese, 190:10 
Guillot, Marie (2014), ‘Identification-free at last. Semantic relativism, Evans’s Legacy and a unified 
approach to immunity to error through misidentification’, Teorema: international journal of philosophy 
Guillot, Marie, and Manuel García-Carpentiro (forthcoming), The Sense of Mineness, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Gjelsvik, O. (2017) ‘Indexicals: what they are essential for’, Inquiry, 60:3, 295-314,  
Hamilton, Andy (2009), ‘Memory and self-consciousness: immunity to error through 
misidentification’, Synthese, 171:3 
Hamilton, A. (2013) The Self in Question: Memory, the Body and Self-Consciousness Palgrave Macmillan  
 15 
Howell, R. (2007) ‘Immunity to error and subjectivity’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604  
Hu, Ivan (2017), ‘The Epistemology of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification’, Journal of 
Philosophy, 114:3 
Ismael, Jenann (2012), ‘Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational 
media’, in Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New 
Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
Johnston, Mark (2010). Surviving Death. Princeton University Press.  
Kang, Shao-Pu (2016), ‘The body swap illusion, and immunity to error through misidentification’, 
Journal of Philosophy, 113:9 
Lane, Timothy and Caleb Liang (2011), ‘Self-consciousness and immunity’, Journal of Philosophy, 
108:2 
Lewis, D (1979). ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, The Philosophical Review 88: 513-543.  
Perry, J. 1979. The essential indexical. Philosophical Review 86: 874–97.  
Liu, J. and  Perry, J(eds.) (2011) Consciousness and the Self: New Essays., Cambridge University Press.  
Longuenesse, B (2017). I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again, Oxford University Press.  
Longworth, G (2014). ‘You and me’, Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303 (2014) 
Madden, Rory (2011), ‘Intention and the Self’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CXI 
Madden, Rory (2013), ‘Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer?’, European Journal of Philosophy, 21:1 
Martin, M.G.F (2014) ‘In the Eye of Another: Comments on Christopher Peacocke’s 
Interpersonal Self-Consciousness’. Philosophical Studies 170 (1): 25-38. 
Magidor, O (2015). ‘The Myth of the De Se’, Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 249-283.  
McGlynn, Aidan (2016), ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Epistemology of 
de se Thoughts’, in About Oneself: de se thought and communication, Oxford: OUP 
McGlynn, Aidan (ms), ‘Immunity to wh-misidentification’. 
 16 
Merlo, Giovanni (2017), ‘Three questions about immunity to error through misidentification’, 
Erkenntnis, 82:3 
Morgan, Daniel (2012), ‘Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about 
the de se?’, in Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: 
New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
Morgan, Daniel (2015), ‘The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought’, Philosophical Studies, 
172:7 
Morgan, Daniel (2018a), ‘Thinking About the Body as Subject’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49:4 
Morgan, D (2018b). ‘Impersonal Intentions’. The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 271 
376–384.  
Morgan, D (2019a), ‘Temporal indexicals are essential’. Analysis Volume 79 (3) (452-61). 
Morgan, D (2019b). ‘Accidentally about me’. Mind  
Musholt, K. Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self, MIT Press, 
2015 
Moss, S., (2012), ‘Updating as communication’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 225–48.  
O’Brien, Lucy (2007), Self-Knowing Agents, Oxford: OUP 
O’Brien, Lucy (2015), ‘Ambulo Ergo Sum’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 76:57-75 
Paul, L (2017a) ‘De se preferences and empathy for future selves’, Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1): 
7-39. 
Paul, L. A (2017b) ‘First person modes of presentation and the structure of empathy’ Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207  
Palmira, Michele (2019), ‘Arithmetic judgments, first-person judgments, and immunity to error 
through misidentification’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10:1 
Palmira, Michele (ms), ‘Immunity, thought insertion and the first person concept’ 
Parrott, Matthew (2017), ‘Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion’, Mind and Language, 
32:1 
 17 
Peacocke, Christopher (2012), ‘Descartes Defended’ in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, 
86:1 
Peacocke, Christopher (2012), ‘Explaining de se phenomena’, in Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati 
(eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
Peacocke, C (2014a), The Mirror of the World Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness, Oxford 
University Press.  
Peacocke, C (2014b), ‘Interpersonal Self-Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-24 (2014) 
Perry, John, (1979), ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs, 13:1 
Prosser, Simon (2012), ‘Sources of immunity to error through misidentification’, in Simon Prosser 
& Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pryor, James (1999), ‘Immunity to error through misidentification’, Philosophical Topics, 26:1/2 
Perry, J. (1979). “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”. Nous, 13(1), 3–21. Reprinted in Perry 
1993, 3–52. ???? pages got more! 
Perry, J. (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Prosser, S & Recanati, F (eds.) (2012). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Simon Prosser (2015) ‘Why are indexicals essential?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115 
(2015), vol. 3.  
Recanati, François (2007), Perspectival Thought: a plea for moderate relativism, Oxford: OUP  
Recanati, François (2009), De re and de se, Dialectica, 63: 3 
Recanati, François (2012), ‘Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it 
comes from’, in Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: 
New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 
 18 
Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine (2013), ‘First-person awareness of intentions and immunity to error 
through misidentification’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21:4 
Rödl, S. Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism, Harvard University 
Press, 2018. 
Shoemaker, S. (1968) Self-reference and self-awareness, Journal of Philosophy, 65 (19), pp. 555–
567 
Salje, L. 2017 ‘Thinking about you’ Mind 126 (503):817-840. 
Salje, Léa (2016), ‘The subjective perspective in introspection’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23:3-
4 
Salje, Léa (2017), ‘Crossed wires about crossed wires: somatosensation and immunity to error 
through misidentification’, Dialectica, 71:1 
Schwenkler, John (2013a), ‘The objects of bodily awareness’, Philosophical Studies, 162:2 
Schwenkler, John (2013b), ‘Review: ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification’ edited by 
Simon Prosser and François Recanati’, Analysis 73:1 
Smith, Joel (2006), ‘Which immunity to error?’, Philosophical Studies, 130:2 
Smith, Joel (2018), ‘The first-person plural and immunity to error’, Disputatio, 10:49 
Spencer, C. (2007), ‘Is there a problem of the essential indexical?’, in Michael O’Rouke and 
Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, MIT Press, pp. 
179–197 
Stanley, J. (2011), Know How, Oxford University Press.  
Titelbaum, M (2017). ‘One’s own reasoning’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 
(3):208-232. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical 
Investigations’, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
 19 
Wright, Crispin (2012) ‘Reflections on François Recanati's,'Immunity to error through 
misidentification: what it is and where it comes from', in Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati 
(eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
